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Abstract
Power systems often rely on natural gas pipeline networks to supply fuel for gas-fired gen-
eration. Market inefficiencies and a lack of formal coordination between the wholesale power
and gas delivery infrastructures may magnify the broader impact of a cyber-attack on a natural
gas pipeline. In this study we present a model that can be used to quantify the impact of
cyber-attacks on electricity and gas delivery operations. We model activation of cyber-attack
vectors that attempt to gain access to pipeline gas compressor controls using a continuous-time
Markov chain over a state space based on the gas operator Industrial Control System firewall
zone partition. Our approach evaluates the operating states and decision-making in the net-
works using physically realistic and operationally representative models. We summarize these
models, the sequence of analyses used to quantify the impacts of a cyber-incident, and propose
a Monte Carlo simulation approach to quantify the resulting effect on the reliability of the bulk
power system by the increase in operational cost. The methodology is applied to a case study
of interacting power, gas, and cyber test networks.
Keywords: Continuous-time Markov chain, cyber-physical Systems, optimal power flow,
Purdue model, transient gas flow
1 Introduction
Reliance on natural gas for electricity generation has increased significantly in many regions of the
world [1]. Low prevailing gas prices [2], increasing penetration of renewable sources [3], and the
retirement of coal power plants [4] have led natural gas to be the main source for energy in U.S. and
European power grids. This creates an interdependence between power and gas delivery systems
that compounds their reliability and security risks [5]. It is becoming increasingly problematic for
generation asset managers to procure natural gas during cold weather events [6] for base load and
ancillary services, which may lead to load curtailments [7, 8].
Critically, the use of natural gas as a generation fuel source has altered the traditional status
quo in which gas consumption is relatively steady and predictable throughout the day [9,10]. This
transition compels the need for analysis tools that incorporate transient pipeline flow modeling
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[11–13]. A deficiency in formal coordination between power and gas delivery operations motivates
the focus of our study on modeling the compounded impacts that may be caused by a malicious
cyber attacker that seeks to maximize operational disruption across networks. In some areas of
the United States, a compressor station may be critical to supply natural gas to fuel up to 7,000
MW [8] of combined electricity generation capacity. An unplanned outage affecting these resources
would disrupt grid operations, and thus it is crucial to understand the risk and consequence of a
meditated attack on such an asset.
In general, cyber-security threats to energy delivery systems appear in the form of unauthorized
commands (e.g. opening a circuit breaker in the power system, a control valve in the natural gas
network, or by changing relay settings), or of obfuscation of situational awareness (e.g. false data
injection attacks that lead to sub-optimal operator decisions). In the former case, an attacker who
is willing to disrupt operations may use a known or zero-day vulnerability to gain root access to a
human machine interface (HMI). Open commands could be sent to a breaker and cause other relays
to trip more lines if remedial actions are not taken in time. In the latter case, malicious agents
may target communication links that are used to deliver data packets through the supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) network. Compromising a single communication link may
affect control over multiple measurements, because measurement data is multiplexed at the remote
terminal unit (RTU).
Network security analysis involves the specification of attack graphs and trees. Attack graphs
may occur in various forms, and attack vectors are challenging to model. There exists a substantial
literature on analysis of attack graphs using Bayesian networks [14–16]. These studies use security
metrics based on graph theory [17] or vulnerability metrics [18,19] such as the common vulnerability
scoring system (CVSS) to study vectors of attack. However, these previous studies do not consider
the importance of the evolving physical state and control protocols of the system, and do not
examine the physical damage that could result in an energy delivery network. We argue that
in a cyber-physical systems (CPS), cyber security is best understood in the context of models
that simulate the underlying physical evolution and real-time operational control. Physical and
economic metrics can then quantify the impacts of a given attack vector on an industrial control
system (ICS). Our main contribution is a modeling approach that incorporates these considerations
when evaluating cyber-attack impacts on infrastructure systems.
This study presents a stochastic adversarial model for quantifying vulnerability of interdepen-
dent gas-electricity delivery infrastructures to operational disruptions caused by cyber-attacks. Our
approach is inspired by a previous study [20], which examined attack vectors for power systems as
a Markov decision process (MDP) that represents attackers attempting to penetrate a corporate
network through the internet, and which is used to emulate the behavior of a strategic agent. In
that model, attackers may gain access to a power system control room from where actions (i.e.
opening a circuit breaker) may be performed. Our study focuses on actions by non-strategic at-
tackers to gain access and control of a gas pipeline network that provides fuel for generation that
constitutes a significant portion of the generation mix of a dependent power grid. We examine
how cyber-physical attacks on gas pipeline components can affect gas flow dynamics, subject to
pipeline engineering and operating constraints, in order to quantify impacts on the ability of the
pipeline to service gas-fired power plants and, in turn, the consequences on electric power systems
security. Our approach is intended to enable methods to uncover vulnerabilities that arise from the
interdependence between these energy systems. In particular, we seek to represent attack vectors
that penetrate a gas cyber-network by acquiring credentials that allow the attacker to penetrate
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the cyber-physical infrastructure to attain direct control of operating points of pipeline gas com-
pressors. The ability of a malicious cyber-attacker to access and control system components is
represented using a finite-horizon continous-time Markov chain (CTMC) [21,22] that includes both
the physical and cyber states. We propose that an energy management system (EMS) contingency
analysis module could explore the likelihood of cyber-compromise events using a state-space ap-
proach, which could could be used offline in a N-k probabilistic outage model. Our formalism could
be extended to include countermeasures, such as intrusion detection systems (IDS), honeypots,
tamper-proof authentication, restrictive firewall rules, etc. We build a benchmark test case based
on the Purdue network architecture model [23]. Finally, we attempt to capture a more realistic
attacker behavior by incorporating the power and gas dynamics into the cyber modeling.
This manuscript is organized as follows. Section II presents the standard for hierarchical se-
cure network architectures and describes interactions among cyber nodes and the physical system.
We describe a cyber-gas-power workflow and the exchange of information among modules in an
adversarial model for attack vectors on power and gas delivery operations. Sections III and IV,
respectively, detail the transient gas and optimal power flow models used to evaluate operational
impacts of attack vectors. Section V present the results of a computational study, and we conclude
in Section VI.
2 Cyber modeling using Markov Chains
The cyber-topology of an ICS is represented by a set of firewall rules that limit the ability of third
parties to control operations. The firewalls and the rules that control access between zones define a
graph in which nodes are the zones that are protected by firewalls and where each edge represents
the possibility of devices from a one zone to penetrate the firewall that defends the next zone. We
refer to this graph as the cyber-topology. A cyber topology contains zones that can include the
enterprise network, the manufacturing zone (e.g. the EMS), and the area zone (e.g. the SCADA
network). The Purdue model [23] sets the current standard for firewalls that secure architectures
in an ICS. All IT systems are located in the enterprise zone, which in the case of energy delivery
systems may include applications such as capacity planning, maintenance scheduling, e-mail, phone,
and printing services, as well as VPN and corporate internet connections [24]. Because of security
concerns, the Purdue model restricts communications between the enterprise and manufacturing
zones to the so-called demilitarized zone (DMZ). In power and natural gas transmission systems,
the manufacturing zone is responsible for controlling operations, and applications in this zone would
include the plant historian, EMS, and file servers, which are core to the reliability and security of the
power systems. The controls resulting from solving mathematical problems in the manufacturing
zone (e.g. a unit commitment and/or economic dispatch in the power system) are then passed to
the area zone where RTUs or programmable logic controllers (PLCs) send commands in real-time
to actuators on the system. Information from metering devices, the status of switching devices,
and alerts are displayed in workstations by human machine interfaces (HMIs). We propose that
interactions between cyber-nodes and physical states of an energy system can be modelled using a
continuous-time finite-state Markov process (i.e. chain), with states corresponding to penetration
of the attacker into a specific zone of the ICS architecture. In this way, the CTMC model states
and state transition matrix correspond to the cyber-topology of the ICS architecture.
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2.1 Continuous-time Markov chain model of attack vectors
We express the Purdue model architecture as an undirected graph Gc = (Vc, Ec) where Vc denotes the
set of cyber assets and Ec are the set of edges or communication links. That is, an edge connecting
two nodes means that bi-directional traffic is allowed between the nodes. Cyber attackers are
modeled as agents that follow a stochastic process {x(t) : t ≥ 0} within a CTMC [21,22]. A CTMC
is represented as a tuple (S, P (t), Q, pi(t), λ) defined on a continuous time interval T = [0, T ] with
an exponential holding time distribution Ti ≈ Exp(λi) λi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ S, where S = {1, 2, . . . , |S|}
denotes the discrete state space. There exists a one-to-one mapping between every state s ∈ S and
its corresponding cyber asset i ∈ Vc. In addition, full control of the device is granted to the agent
when a state from the Markov chain is realized. That is, the access to the area zone implies control
over the substation actuators. Additionally, pi(t) =
(
p(x(t) = 1), p(x(t) = 2), . . . , p(x(t) = |S|)) is
the vector of probabilities of being at a given state at time t. The matrix P (t) ∈ [0, 1]|S|×|S| denotes
the transition probability matrix and is defined for all times t ∈ T . The set of communication
links Ec provides the structure to P (t), therefore the probability of transitioning between two states
where no communications are allowed is 0. Q ∈ R|S|×|S| is the transition rate matrix which accounts
for holding times. The transition rate matrix Q can be obtained from the jump chain probability
as
Qij =
{
λipij if i 6= j,
−λi if i = j, (1)
where pij is the embedded Markov jump probability between the i-th and j-th states. Note that
pij 6= [P (t)]ij , because the system evolves with time. Here pij denotes the probability of an attacker
to bypass a firewall rule. The state space contains a recurrent absorbing state that corresponds to
the detection of the attacker by the operator, and the remaining states are transient. Therefore,
there is a unique stationary point distribution. We determine pij according to a security score that
rates the likelihood of a given asset vulnerability to be exploited. Security scores can be found in
ICS-CERT [25] under advisories [20]. The holding time parameters λi, ∀i ∈ S, depend on the level
of activity in the network. Also, calculating P (t) for the continuous-time case is more challenging
than in the discrete-time problem where P (t) = P t for t ≥ 1. The transition probability dynamics
evolve according to
d
dt
P (t) = P (t)Q, (2)
with initial condition P (0) = I (i.e., no transitions are allowed at the initial state). The equation
(2) denotes Kolmogorov’s forward differential equation [26]. The solution to (2) is
P (t) = etQ ≡
∞∑
n=0
(tQ)n
n!
. (3)
For convenience, it is assumed that initially the attacker resides on the internet, i.e., pi(0) =
(1, 0, . . . , 0). Attacks may occur as a series of escalating vulnerability exploitations in the commu-
nication infrastructure, which may lead the attacker to the control room. Attackers may control
the area zone (e.g. a substation RTU or PLC) and may alter controls sent to the field devices and
change the setpoints. Software of various cyber assets such as RTUs or PLC devices are provided by
vendors and may contain known vulnerabilities to an attacker [25]. The attacker may also change
the factory settings of a sensing device (i.e. a relay) provided by the vendor. This relay may send
an open signal command to the circuit breaker due to bad modified settings. The consequences
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may include a redistribution of flows due to a change in the system topology, or an imbalance in
the system if the generator setpoint is changed. Additionally, the HMI may be displaying false
measurements, and may induce operators to believe that the system is in a different operating
state for which suboptimal actions might be taken. The impacts of a cyber attack may compound
the consequences of flaws in system design (e.g. resulting from inadequate transmission or capacity
planning) experienced during extreme events.
The range of possible actions taken by a malicious agent with control access to an energy system
(i.e. the discrete range of generator/compressor setpoints, the status of a circuit breaker/transformer,
or the discrete interval of relay settings) are represented as states in the CTMC. In other words,
the CTMC state space is characterized by the cyber and physical topology (i.e. the different hi-
erarchical levels corresponding to the Purdue model, and substations) as well as set of actions an
attacker may take to disrupt physical operations. An example of the CTMC graph is shown in
Fig. 1
When the network gets attacked, i.e. when the Markov chain lands in a state that has the ability
to control operations in real-time, a sequence of problems are solved to evaluate the operational
impact of such attacks as presented in the following section. In this paper, we consider two ICS,
namely the gas and electric grid interactions in the presence of a cyber-attack to the gas network.
2.2 Modelling the interactions between power, cyber and gas
Electricity and natural gas delivery operations rely on different practices to ensure reliability, re-
siliency, and security. Operator decisions can maintain normal functions of the system even given
congestion and unexpected conditions. Therefore, the modelling of physics and real-world prac-
tices is paramount in assessing the impact of a cyber event. In the electric power sector, operations
typically rely on the solution of two core optimization problems: 1) security-constrained unit com-
mitment (SCUC), which is used for day-ahead scheduling of generators and reserve procurement;
and 2) a DC optimal power flow (DCOPF), which is used to re-dispatch fast reacting units (e.g.
gas turbines) in near real-time to compensate for imbalances arising from imperfect day-ahead
forecasts. While the unit commitment problem in power systems is a well established framework
(see e.g. [27–30] and “security-constrained” variations of the problem [31, 32]), gas pipeline oper-
ations usually depend on labor-intensive heuristic approaches. Physical gas flow control is often
reactive and may be sub-optimal. The use of optimization for pipeline operational scheduling under
transient conditions is an active area of research [9, 11,12,33].
The workflow of the mathematical problems we solve to study the impacts of cyber attacks is
presented in Fig. 1. The SCUC provides the schedules and natural gas nominations for power plants
in the day-ahead markets, and the DCOPF in real-time re-dispatches generation as needed. For
simplicity, we model synchronous 24-hour market periods, although this does not hold in practice in
many regions. Because pipeline operations rely entirely on the judgement of experienced operators
rather than on optimization-based decision support, we use transient optimal gas flow (TOGF)
as a best case proxy for the actions of gas control operators to determine compressor operating
setpoints. To evaluate the operational state of the pipeline system after a contingency, we use a
transient gas flow (TGF) initial boundary value problem (IBVP) simulation. In the cyber domain,
we model attack vectors through one CTMC, as is illustrated in Fig. (1), that corresponds to the
cyber-topology of the natural gas network. In this study, we only consider the case of attacks that
attempt to access and control compressor stations, but the model is easily extensible to attacks on
other system components as well as on the power system. When an attacker causes a compressor
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Figure 1: Summary of power, cyber, and gas network modelling. On the left side, we show the
agents modelled in the problem that include operators, SCADA communications, the attacker, and
the governing physics for the power grid and gas pipeline network. In the center of the figure, each
block denotes our model for the decisions or action taken over time in sequence aligned vertically
with the various agents that are operating in the coupled cyber-physical system. The times when the
attacker penetrates the system, enters the control area zone, causes a contingency, and is detected
are denoted by t0, t1, t2, and t3, respectively. On the right, we show an example of a Markov chain
where the state space includes each of the areas in the Purdue model. Each area zone is coupled
with a physical gas node of a 4-node pipeline network test case (i.e. a substation) where HMIs,
PLCs and RTUs are located. Dashed edges connect cyber and physical nodes. Dotted edges denote
the transitions to the detection state. Below the CTMC, a sample case of interdependent power-gas
networks is shown. The blocks that are grayed-out are not explicitly coded in our numerical model.
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contingency, as observed in a transition of the CTMC to an appropriate state, we suppose that the
boost ratio of the compressor drops to unity, so that downstream pipeline pressure may drop below
minimum levels. If the pressure is sufficiently reduced, the pipeline operator will detect the event
and issue a warning to the power system operator. When pressure is not restored to adequate values,
gas supplies to power plants will be curtailed. This will require shutdown of gas-fired generators,
which may be providing operational reserves to the power grid. In response, the power system
will re-solve a DCOPF to dispatch spinning reserves and clear the contingency. However, power
system reliability practices that require the N-1 security criteria could be insufficient if multiple
gas-fired generators rely on natural gas delivered by a pipeline that depends on a single compressor,
and thus, may not maintain sufficient line pressure [34]. Also, operational generation reserves may
not be available when the contingency occurs if they are procured from gas-fired power plants.
Ultimately, such a chain of events will result in power load curtailment. In the following sections,
we describe the conceptual and mathematical approaches, as well as numerical methods, that we
use to simulate the decisions that power grid and gas pipeline operators would take for active
management of interacting systems under attack.
3 Modeling of gas system operations
Historically, consumption of natural gas has been slowly varying and highly correlated to the
weather [35]. Natural gas pipeline managers have used simple capacity-based models to evaluate
the ability of natural gas pipelines to support transport contracts in the day-ahead market [12]. The
increase of natural gas usage for electricity generation has created significant intra-day fluctuations
in gas consumption. Gas pipeline operators may rely on operating processes that assume steady
ratable use of natural gas [9,36–38], which do not accurately capture large fuel offtake ramps caused
by the use of gas-fired generators to balance the variability and uncertainty in net-load [39]. This
compels development and use of models that capture transient gas flow phenomena.
3.1 Modelling transient gas dynamics in a network
Recent studies have proposed new transient simulation and optimization tools that model intra-day
transient gas dynamics in large-scale pipelines, their effect on pipeline capacity, and the conse-
quences for dependent electric power systems [13]. We consider the case of a gas network where
gas can be injected, compressed or withdrawn. An example of a single pipeline with a compressor
station is shown in Fig. 2. A natural gas pipeline network can be represented as a directed graph
Gg = (Vg, Eg) where Vg represents the set of nodes i ∈ Vg where gas can be withdrawn or injected.
Eg represents the set of gas pipelines e = (i, j) ∈ Eg that connect two nodes i, j where gas can be
compressed with a ratio of outlet to inlet pressures αe > 1, or transported (i.e., αe = 1). Also,
we denote Fi = {(i, j) | (i, j) ∈ Eg and i ∈ Vg ∀j}, Ti = {(j, i) | (j, i) ∈ Eg and i ∈ Vg ∀i} as the
set of edges connected to the i-th “from” or “to” node, respectively. We describe the evolution of
compressible gas along a pipeline using a simplification of the 1-D Euler equations. We apply a
non-dimensional transformation to the Euler equations in a single pipe following prior work [9], to
yield
∂tρe(t, xe)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Accumulation of mass
+ ∂xφe(t, xe)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net mass flux
= 0, (4)
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Figure 2: A pipeline with a compressor station
∂tφe(t, xe)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inertial forces
+ ∂xρe(t, xe)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pressure forces
= − λe`
2De
φe(t, xe)|φe(t, xe)|
ρe(t, xe)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Friction forces
, (5)
where (4) represents the continuity equation (conservation of mass) and (5) is the momentum
conservation equation. The right hand side of (5) represents the Darcy-Weisbach equation where
λ is the Darcy friction factor. ρe and φe denote the gas density and flux in the direction of motion
(x), respectively. These variables are defined for the domain [0, Le] × [0, T ] being Le and T the
length of the pipe and time horizon. D is the diameter of the pipe and c denotes the speed of the
sound defined by the ideal gas law as p = c2ρ where p is the pressure. It should be noted that (4)
and (5) assume slow dynamics (v ≤ 15 m/s), neglect gravitational forces (horizontal pipes), and
assume no temperature gradients (long pipes and high pressures). Density compatibility conditions
related to pipe pressures are given by
ρe(t, 0) = αe(t)ρi(t) ∀i : e ∈ Fi, (6)
ρe(t, Le) = ρi(t) ∀i : e ∈ Ti. (7)
Constraints on nodal and compressor outlet densities are
ρ
i
≤ ρi(t) ≤ ρi ∀i ∈ Vg, (8)
αe(t)ρi(t) ≤ ρi ∀i : e ∈ Fi, (9)
where ρ
i
, ρi denote the lower and upper density limits, respectively. Similarly, we impose limits on
compressor ratios,
1 ≤ αe(t) ≤ αe ∀e ∈ E . (10)
where αe is the compressor boost ratio upper limit. The gas flow balance equation at a node is
defined as
dgi (t) =
∑
e∈Ti
Aeφe(t, Le)−
∑
e∈Fi
Aeφe(t, 0), ∀i ∈ Vg, (11)
where dgi denotes the net gas injection at the i-th node and Ae is the cross-sectional area of the
pipe e. Similarly we impose limits on gas injections or withdrawals with the constraints
dgi ≤ dgi (t) ≤ d
g
i ∀i ∈ Vg (12)
8
where dgi and d
g
i are the minimum and maximum withdrawals at the node. In addition, the energy
consumed by the compressor stations is given as
JG =
∑
∀e∈E
Ae
∫ T
0
|φe(t, 0)|
ηe
(α(γ−1)/γe (t)−1)dt, (13)
where ηe is a scaling factor that includes compressor efficiency and γ is the gas specific heat capacity
ratio [40]. We use a reduced control system model where the spatial dimension is discretized
using a lumped-element scheme [9]. Letting N = |Vg| and E = |Eg|, we define the vector of
nodal densities ρ =
(
ρL1 , . . . , ρ
L
N
)T
, the vectors of mass flux at the beginning and end of the pipe
φ0 =
(
φ01, . . . , φ
0
E
)T
, φL =
(
φL1 , . . . , φ
L
E
)T
, and injections or withdrawals dg =
(
dg1, . . . , d
g
N
)T
. In
addition, let Φ = 12(φ0 + φL). We define the weighted incidence matrix B ∈ RN×E by
Bij =

1 edge j enters node i, i.e., j = i
−αj edge j leaves node i, i.e., j = i+ 1
0 else
(14)
where A = sign(B) is the incidence matrix. Similarly, we define As and Bs as the incidence matrix
corresponding to the nodes with known pressure, and Bd and Ad denote the remaining rows. We
define the diagonal matrices Λ, K and X with diagonal entries Λee = Le, Kee = `λe/De and
Xee = piD
2
e/4 defined ∀e ∈ Eg. In matrix-vector notation, the system dynamics (4), (5), and (11)
now become
|Ad|XΛ
∣∣BTd ∣∣ ρ˙ = 4 (AdXΦ− dg)− |Ad|XΛ ∣∣BTs ∣∣ s˙ (15)
Φ˙ = −Λ−1 (BTs s+BTd ρ)−Kg (φ, ∣∣BTs ∣∣ s+ ∣∣BTd ∣∣ ρ) (16)
where the function g : RM × RM+ → RM is defined by gj(x, y) = xj |xj | /yj . It should be noted
that (15) is a result of combining (4) and (11). Refer to [9, 41] for the full derivation of (15) and
(16). We use the above state space model to formulate and solve the following fundamental gas
transport problems.
3.1.1 Transient optimal gas flow (TOGF)
We solve and optimal transient control problem where compressor ratios are minimized subject to
the transient gas flow dynamic constraints and operating limits as follows
minαj ,∀j compressor energy JG (13)
s.t. system dynamics (15)− (16)
pressure limits (8)− (9)
compressor limits (10)
supply and demand limits (12)
(17)
3.1.2 Transient gas flow (TGF)
We solve the differential equations (15)-(16) as an implicit Differential Algebraic Equation (DAE).
The DAEs are structured as follows
0 = F
([
ρ˙
Φ˙
]
,
[
ρ
Φ
]
,
[
α
dg
])
= F ( x˙︸︷︷︸
gradient
, x︸︷︷︸
state
, u︸︷︷︸
controls
) (18)
where ρ and Φ are state variables, x ∈ RN+E , and α, dg are the control variables u ∈ R|Vdg |+|Ecg |.
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4 Modeling of power system operations
A power system network is represented as a graph Gp = (Vp, Ep) where Vp is the set of electric buses
and Ep is the set of branches. Also, let Np = |Vp| and Ep = |Ep|. We formulate a SCUC problem
for day-ahead scheduling and a DC-OPF for generation dispatch in real-time.
4.1 Security-Constrained Unit Commitment (SCUC)
North American Energy Reliability Corporation (NERC) standards require power systems to func-
tion reliably given an outage of any power system asset [42]. The SCUC formulation presented
below guarantees that the power system is secure against a generator outage contingency. We
solve an optimization problem defined on a discrete time interval T = {1, 2, . . . , N} that optimizes
operational cost:
JucP = P
T
gtcg + u
T
gtc
nl
g + v
T
gtc
su
g + w
T
gtc
sd
g + r
T
gtc
r
g, ∀t ∈ T , (19)
where Pgt ∈ RNp is the vector of power injections, ugt ∈ {0, 1}Np and vgt,wgt ∈ [0, 1]Np are the
vector of commitment, start-up and shut-down binary variables, respectively. We define rgt ∈ RNp
as the vector of reserve capacities. Similarly, cg, c
nl
g , c
su
g , c
sd
g , c
r
g ∈ RNp are the vector of generator,
no-load, start-up, shut-down, and capacity reserve costs, respectively. We use the subscript t to
index the elements of Pg as provided in T . The power flow thermal limits are
P` ≤ PTDFR
(
Pgt − dpt
) ≤ P`, ∀t ∈ T , (20)
where dpt ∈ RNp is the vector of power withdrawals and P` and P` are the minimum and maximum
power line thermal limits, respectively. PTDFR ∈ REp×Np denotes the power transfer distribution
factor with respect to the reference bus, and can be calculated as PTDF = HB′−1 where H ∈
REp×(Np−1) is the power flow Jacobian and B′ ∈ R(Np−1)×(Np−1) denotes the susceptance matrix
excluding the row and column that correspond to the reference bus. Constraints on generator limits
are given by
diag(Pg)ugt + rgt ≤ Pgt ≤ diag(Pg)ugt − rgt, ∀t ∈ T , (21)
where Pg and Pg are the minimum and maximum generator limits, respectively. The operator
diag(.) returns a diagonal matrix with the elements of the vector argument. Generation must
balance system load at all times, as enforced by
1TPgt = 1
Tdpt , ∀t ∈ T , (22)
and we impose ramp rate limits on the generation:
Pgt −Pg,t−1 ≤ diag(Rhrg )ug,t−1 + diag(Rsug )vgt, ∀t ∈ T , (23)
Pg,t−1 −Pgt ≤ diag(Rhrg )ugt + diag(Rsdg )wgt, ∀t ∈ T , (24)
where Rhrg ,R
su
g ,R
sd
g ∈ RNp are the hourly, start-up, and shut-down ramping rates. The commit-
ment constraints are expressed using binary variables, and are given as
t∑
s=t−tug+1
vgs ≤ ugt, ∀t ∈ {tug , . . . , N}, (25)
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t∑
s=t−tdg+1
wgs ≤ 1− ugt, ∀t ∈ {tdg, . . . , N}, (26)
vgt −wgt = ugt − ug,t−1, ∀t ∈ T , (27)
where tug and t
d
g are the minimum up and down times of generator g. Allocation of reserve capacity
is guaranteed by imposing the constraints
1Trgt ≥ 1T(0.07dpt ), ∀t ∈ T , (28)
1Trgt ⊗ 1 ≥ Pgt + rgt, ∀t ∈ T , (29)
rgt ≤ diag(Rg)ugt, ∀t ∈ T . (30)
In other words, the system must be able to allocate enough capacity to cover the outage of any
single generator or 7% of the load at any given time, whichever is larger. The SCUC optimization
problem is
minPgt operational cost J
uc
P (19)
s.t. power flow limits (20)
generator limits (21)
power balance (22)
ramping limits (23)− (24)
commitment constraints (25)− (27)
reserve capacity constraints (28)− (30)
(31)
4.2 DC Optimal Power Flow (DC-OPF)
To emulate economic re-dispatch in real-time electricity markets, we use a DC-OPF formulation
∀t ∈ T = {1, 2, . . . , N} where the commitment variables and reserves are passed as parameters.
The optimization problem is
minPgt P
T
gtcg
s.t. power flow limits (20)
generator limits (21)
power balance (22)
ramping limits (23)− (24)
(32)
4.3 Physical coupling between power and gas infrastructures
We model the interconnections between the wholesale gas and electricity sectors created by gas-fired
generators using quadratic heat curves of the form
dgi [t] = β(a · P 2it + b · Pit + c) ∀i ∈ Vp ∩ Vg, ∀t ∈ T , (33)
where a, b, and c are heat rate coefficients and β : MMBTU/MWh→ kg/s is a conversion factor.
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Table 1: Coupling of pipeline nodes to gas-fired generators.
Gas Node Generator ID Total Capacity (MW)
6 4,20,21 255
8 5,22,23 255
12 11,24,25 255
13 12,26,27 255
18 13,28,29 255
19 15,31 231
24 36,37,38 228
25 39,40 152
5 Simulation Case Study and Results
We present a study to showcase the numerical results that can be obtained by concatenating the
modules described in Fig. 1. One realization of the workflow is a stochastic process where the
nonlinear evolution in the state of the energy networks depends on the time interval during which
the Markov chain is in a state that represents compromised gas compressor operations. In order
to quantify the distribution of the stochastic process and the resulting effect on energy delivery
reliability, we perform Monte Carlo simulation of the stochastic process and examine its statistics.
Test System: The cyber-gas-power numerical analysis is done on the IEEE-118 test case [43]
for the power system coupled with a 25-node gas test case from [11] with five compressor stations.
We model the coupling of gas-fired generators in the gas network as shown in Table 1. The generator
heat rate coefficients are shown in Table 2. The natural gas cyber-network follows the Purdue model
discussed in Sec. 2, resulting in the CTMC shown in Fig. 1. We use one absorbing state to denote
the attack detection state. Attacks occur as a series of firewall vulnerability exploitations that lead
to compressor station contingencies and are modelled by the transition probabilities. We assume
that compressor stations with higher impact in the a radial gas network to have higher vulnerability
scores, thus, reflecting the fact that some areas will be more difficult to access.
Table 2: Gas-fired generator heat rates [44]
a b c
Combustion turbine 4.46 -9.95 15.11
Steam turbine 1.7 -3.87 12
Combined cycle 5.8 -11.2 12.87
Implementation: We use Julia/JuMP v0.19.2 to solve the optimization problems. JuMP is
used to call the non-linear solver Ipopt [45] to solve the non-convex, non-linear TOGF, and Gurobi
is called for the SCUC and DCOPF which are mixed-integer (MIP) and linear (LP) programs,
respectively. The physical flows in the natural gas network are modelled using the TGF IBVP
presented in Section 3. The DAEs are solved by using the solver IDA in Sundials. IDA uses a
variable-order, variable-coefficient Backward Differentiation Formula (BDF) with a modified New-
ton iteration method and is called through the Julia package “DifferentialEquations.jl”. The initial
conditions are obtained by solving a steady-state optimization problem, i.e. we set ρ˙ = 0 and
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Φ˙ = 0 in (17), for which we use an absolute tolerance of 10−5 and a relative tolerance of 10−6. We
obtain 10,000 samples of the Markov chain over a 24-hour operational day through the Monte Carlo
simulation. The total processing time is less than 30 minutes using an Intel i7 4-core processor
2018 Macbook Pro.
Simulation workflow: First, we compute a baseline SCUC and DCOPF solution for the power
system, which results in a gas load at the node. Figure 3 illustrates one instance of the physical
system states at gas node 6 that services gas-fired generators 4, 20 and 21 with a combined capacity
of 255 MW. Note that the nominal pressure at that node is just over 500 psi, which is the minimum
pressure bound in the network. A TOGF is then used to compute the gas compressor profile and
nodal gas pressure under normal operations (shown in blue in the figure). The CTMC is used to
compute the timing of a compressor outage in the form of contingency and recovery times, between
which an upstream gas compressor pressure boost ratio drops to αe ≡ 1. We then perform a TGF
simulation to show the resulting effect on the nodal pressure (shown in orange in the figure). When
the pressure drops below minimum levels, we suppose that the gas-fired generator is curtailed, which
results in an acceptable nodal pressure (shown in green in the Figure). However, the production
of the curtailed power plant must be replaced with more expensive resources, which increases the
economic cost of production. We thus quantify the impacts of cyber-attacks by the resulting cost
of reserves and by the percentage of electric load shed.
The range of outcomes that could result from a contingency in a natural gas compressor station
is given in Fig. 4. The 25-node tree network heavily relies on compressor 1 to sustain a minimum
pressure. A contingency in compressor 1 will result in natural gas fuel curtailments to all gas-
fired generators. As a consequence, the power system operator will re-dispatch its most expensive
generator to balance the system, deploy reserves and sometimes curtail power load with results in an
increase in cost up to 150%. In fact, such an outcome would be expected for actual pipelines, which
have topological tree structures. Another scenario may involve an attacker targeting compressor 2,
which provides natural gas to all generators connected to gas nodes 6 and 8. The power system is not
compliant with events that cause multiple contingencies and thus such an event may compromise
power system reliability. In Fig. 5, we examine how curtailed gas loads correlate to the increase
in operational cost for power systems, and also examine the power load curtailment with respect
to the operational cost increase and curtailed gas loads. We see a strong correlation between the
operational cost and curtailed gas load (R = 0.9813), and also observe that there exist cases where
the increase in cost also results in the highest power load shedding.
6 Conclusion
This study provides a detailed simulation framework to rigorously analyze the impacts of malicious
cyber-attacks on the physical and operating states of interdependent natural gas and electric power
transmission infrastructures. We incorporate the power and natural gas dynamics into the cyber
modeling to better capture the consequences of attacks on an energy system. The proposed model-
ing approach can be extended to accommodate any ICS with any firewall policy in place. Through
a numerical study involving cyber attacks restricted to gas compressor contingencies in a pipeline,
we show that such an attack can cause significant cost increase and disruption in the operations of
the power grid. Our results suggest that N-1 security standards may not suffice to guarantee reli-
able power system operation. Additionally, coordinated power and gas delivery operations would
increase the reliability of both sectors. Going forward, we will extend our attack construction to
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Figure 3: Sample of the cyber-gas-power simulation workflow shown for a node in the gas test
network at node 6. Top: compressor ratio at station 3; center: nodal gas pressure; bottom: gas
load at the node. TOGF solutions without contingency (blue), given a contingency (orange), and
correction by generator curtailment (green).
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Figure 4: Compressor contingency boxplot. The y-axis shows the power operational cost increase
as a percentage of the base case without contingencies
more potent adversaries that can target not just gas compressor operations, but other system com-
ponents such as control valves, storage fields, or power system equipment. Our future work will
also extend the modeling of cyber-attacker behavior by employing a Markov decision process that
involves observed system states, rather than a single Markov chain only.
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